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An Investigation of the Association between Corporate Governance, Earnings Management 
and the Effect of Governance Reforms 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of recent corporate governance 
reforms on the association between governance practices and earnings management. 
  
Design/methodology/approach - This study examines the impact of corporate governance 
reforms by using a firm fixed-effect, cross-sectional analysis of 200 firms listed on the ASX for 
the financial years ending in 2000 and 2005. This paper examines the association between firms’ 
corporate governance practices and the quality of financial reports as measured by the magnitude 
of earnings management pre-and post- the governance reforms (CLERP 9 and ASX CGC).  
 
Findings - The results of this study indicate that certain governance practices are important in 
limiting earnings management.  In particular, board independence and audit committee 
independence, are associated with lower performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, one 
commonly used measure of earnings management. However, increasing executive shareholdings 
provides incentives to manage earnings.   
 
Practical implications – This study is important to investors, academics and policy makers as it 
demonstrates that governance reforms that encourage firms to adopt better governance practices 
reduces the likelihood of earnings management. 
 
Originality/value - There is limited research on the association between corporate governance 
practices or the recent corporate governance reforms (ASX CGC Recommendations and CLERP 
9) on earnings management in Australia.  This study extends the literature by demonstrating the 
impact of recent corporate governance reforms on board independence, audit committee 
effectiveness and executive directors’ shareholding and the association with earnings 
management.  
 
 
Keywords Earnings management, insider share ownership, corporate governance practices and 
reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance controls are designed to encourage the efficient use of company resources 
and promote accountability for the stewardship of resources used by managers (Cadbury, 2000). 
The recent global spate of companies using fraudulent accounting methods to mask declining 
financial conditions has attracted the attention of regulators and accountants. The U.S. 
government responded to the corporate scandals with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in January 2002.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is designed to review dated legislative audit requirements and 
applies to publicly listed companies.  The Australian response to these corporate indiscretions is 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Best Practice Recommendations 
and the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 
(known as CLERP 9).   
The ASX Corporate Governance Council (CGC) released its Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in March 2003. It includes 28 
(optional) recommendations relating to 10 corporate governance principles.  The adoption rate of 
the recommendations is very promising. The average adoption rate for all 28 recommendations 
was 74% in 2005 (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2006). The underlying objective of 
CLERP 9, which became law in Australia in 2004, is to promote transparency, to strengthen the 
regulatory framework in the key areas of corporate accountability and protection of shareholder 
rights. CLERP 9 introduced civil liability in the Corporations Act for breaches of the ASX 
continuous disclosure requirements and extends liability to directors and executives1. The civil 
liability assigned to board members is designed to encourage listed companies to increase the 
financial literacy and independence of audit committee members.  
This study is motivated by two considerations. First, are specific corporate governance 
practices associated with lower levels of earnings management in 2000 or 2005? Second, are 
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improvements in specific corporate governance practices between 2000 and 2005 associated with 
lower levels of earnings management?  We examine the impact of corporate governance reforms 
by examining the association between firms’ corporate governance practices and the quality of 
their financial reports as measured by the magnitude of earnings management (proxied by 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals) pre-and post- the governance reforms (CLERP 9 
and ASX CGC). The focus of our research is on board and audit committee effectiveness which 
encompasses greater board and audit committee independence.  Given that the ASX CGC 
recommendations and CLERP 9 are designed to improve the quality of financial reporting, we 
would expect to observe a significant reduction in earnings management in firms that change 
their corporate governance practices to comply with the recommendations.  
This paper contributes to the research on corporate governance in several ways.  There is 
an extensive body of literature on the impact of corporate governance practices on various 
outcomes, such as, firm performance, the value relevance of earnings, earnings management and 
the impact of regulation. The vast majority of the research examines the effects of corporate 
governance practices and regulations in the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
This notion has not been fully explored in the Australian context, a market similar but different in 
certain aspects. In Australia, expected litigation costs are relatively low and the provision of 
forward-looking accounting information is voluntary. There is limited research on the association 
between corporate governance practices or the recent corporate governance reforms (ASX CGC 
Recommendations and CLERP 9) on earnings management in Australia. 
The results of the study of the corporate governance practices of 200 Australian listed firms 
indicate that certain governance practices are important in limiting earnings management.  The 
results of this study demonstrate that the association between corporate governance practices and 
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earnings management is only significant post the governance reforms in the year 2005.  Board 
independence and audit committee independence are negatively associated with the level of 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (PACDA), indicating lower levels of earnings 
management, while executive shareholdings are positively associated with performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals. However, there is no significant relationship between the number of audit 
committee meetings and performance-adjusted discretionary accruals.  Following governance 
reforms, board and audit committee independence improved, and audit committee meeting 
frequency increased significantly. However, these changes are not necessarily associated with 
less earnings management.  The results of this study show that improvements in board 
independence are associated with decreases in PACDA, while increasing audit committee activity 
is not associated with PACDA.  There is no significant association with earnings management for 
firms that increased audit committee independence following the governance reforms.  However 
it should be noted that audit committee independence is significantly associated with lower 
PACDA in 2005.  There is no significant reduction in executive share ownership post the reforms 
and the positive and significant association between executive share ownership and PACDA 
remains.   
 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
According to agency theory the separation between ownership and control may lead to self-
interested actions by managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When conflicts exist between 
management and stakeholders, the value of the firm is not maximised and the difference between 
the theoretical maximum value of the firm and the actual value of the firm is attributed to agency 
costs (Palliam and Shalhoub, 2003).  Prior research provides evidence of myriad incentives that 
motivate managers to manage earnings, such as the quality of the audit firm (Davidson III et al., 
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2004; Myung and Taewoo, 2004), the distribution of ownership (Hsu and Koh, 2005; Koh, 
2003), CEO’s with dual leadership positions (Davidson et al., 2004), the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Tendelo and Vanstraelen, 2005), management share 
ownership (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), tax incentives (Dhaliwal et al., 2004) and hiring 
an executive from a company’s external audit firm (Geiger et al., 2005).  Myung and Taewoo 
(2004) suggest managers adjust discretionary accruals to increase current-period earnings before 
they sell their own firms' shares. The majority of this research argues that earnings manipulation 
is concealing the truth about earnings and has potentially negative effects on stakeholders’ 
interests.  This potential conflict of interest leads to the need to monitor managers’ behaviour in 
order to protect shareholders’ rights.  
Corporate governance provides a framework to ensure suppliers of corporate finance 
achieve a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The board of directors and audit 
committees are the two main internal corporate governance mechanisms established to monitor 
managers’ behaviour and also ensure the reliability of financial reporting. Extensive research has 
been conducted relating to the association between earnings management and certain corporate 
governance practices, including board and audit committee composition (Agrawal and Chadha, 
2005; Beasley, 1996; Davidson, et al., 2005; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Vafeas, 2005).  
On balance, the majority of this research has found that the probability of earnings management 
is lower in companies with an independent board or an effective audit committee. 
In order to align agents’ incentives with interests of principals, diverse governance 
mechanisms are built into the agency contracts (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983).  The role of 
regulation in this process can be explained by referring to agency theory.  Regulation attempts to 
overcome information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and protect each party’s 
contractual rights.  Due to incomplete contracts, regulation (e.g. ASX CGC and CLERP 9) 
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attempts to protect stakeholders by mandating corporate governance practices.  Regulations 
smooth the progress of the efforts of contracting parties to maximise the joint gains (the 
contractual surplus) from transactions (Schwartz and Scott, 2003). Changes in regulations 
comprise a source of experiments (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991) and for this reason our study 
examines the impact of recent corporate governance reforms on the quality of financial reporting.  
Financial report preparers in Australia have recently experienced changes to their roles 
and responsibilities. Some changes have arisen from the decision to adopt IFRS. Other changes 
have arisen in response to events in the business environment such as initiatives to improve 
auditors' independence (Brown and Tarca, 2005). The main focus of CLERP 9 can be classified 
into two parts: first, accounting and audit reform, especially aiming to improve the independence 
of auditors and emphasise the board’s accountability for the financial report; and second, 
enhancing corporate disclosure. Corporate governance is no longer left to be accomplished 
through voluntary disclosures as CLERP 9 is enforced through a regime of rules that carry 
criminal penalties.  The Corporations Act enforces continuous reporting obligations on 
companies that are disclosing entities, listed companies and some unlisted public companies with 
more than 100 shareholders, when certain material events take place regarding the company’s 
operations or financial position (Hanrahan et al., 2004).  The Corporations Act is not only 
concerned with the disclosure of information, but also with ensuring (as much as possible) the 
quality of the information (Hanrahan et al., 2004). If regulation is effective and enhanced 
corporate disclosure decreases the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, 
then earnings quality should improve. 
2. 1 Board of Directors 
The board of directors does not bear the major share of the wealth effects of their decisions 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983) and exists to prevent management from pursuing their personal 
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objectives at the expense of the stakeholders (Fama, 1980).   The composition of a board plays a 
crucial role in corporate governance mechanisms.  The board must ensure the integrity of the 
corporation’s accounting and financial reporting systems. These systems include monitoring risk, 
financial control, and compliance with regulations. According to the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee (2002), an effective board of 
directors should ensure the validity of the accounting choices made by management and the 
financial consequences of such decisions (Davidson et al., 2005). 
Prior research has found that the board of directors can play an important role in 
increasing the quality of financial reporting. According to Beasley (1996), as the number of 
independent directors on the board increases, the likelihood of financial reporting fraud 
decreases. Dechow et al. (1996) suggest that firms manipulating earnings are more likely to have 
boards of directors dominated by management. The probability of earnings manipulation is lower 
in companies with boards or audit committees that have an independent director with financial 
expertise (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). Persons (2006) argues that the higher the independence of 
directors, the lower the likelihood of non-financial reporting fraud (i.e.,fraud against customers 
and governments, and violation of regulations other than financial reporting).  
Chen and Jaggi (2000) find that the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards is positively associated with the comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. Klein (2002) 
found a negative relationship between board independence and abnormal accruals, a measure of 
earnings management.  In contrast, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that firms benefit from having 
insiders on the board given that senior managers bring in expertise and improve the decision 
making process. In addition, Bedard et al. (2004) fail to find an association between the level of 
board independence and earnings quality with respect to U.S. firms.   
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The research in this area generally suggests that there is a negative association between 
the level of board independence and earnings management which leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1a: There is a negative association between the level of board independence and 
earnings management. 
2.1.1 The effect of regulation on the association between earnings management and the board 
of directors 
Do corporate governance reforms and the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms prevent 
management’s manipulation of earnings? In the U.S., SOX was followed by other corporate 
reforms such as those by the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers, and 
American Stock Exchange reforms. As a result of these reforms, listed companies in the U.S. 
must have a majority of outside independent directors (Petra, 2006).  
Petra (2006), examines the actual governance structures of Enron, WorldCom, and Global 
Crossing during the years of their accounting scandals. The proportions of outside independent 
directors on the boards of those companies during that period were: 50 percent to 55 percent for 
Enron Corp., 40 percent to 50 percent for WorldCom Inc. and 25 percent to 45 percent for Global 
Crossing Ltd. Despite the presence of the outside independent directors, these companies suffered 
collapses in their corporate governance systems (Petra, 2006). 
If we consider Australian examples before their collapses, the board of HIH Insurance 
Limited consisted of seven directors of which five were non-executive directors (71%) and the 
board of One.Tel Limited consisted of nine directors of which five were non-executive directors 
(56%). From the previous examples of corporate collapses it is hard to say that new reforms will 
prevent the reoccurrence of the corporate collapses and improve earnings management. If those 
who are charged with governance only focus on the form, that is, the appearance of compliance 
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with the corporate reforms, it is be highly likely that these reforms will not have any positive 
effect on the quality of financial reporting. The directors need to focus on the substance of the 
reforms to improve the quality of financial reporting.   
If regulation does have a positive effect on board of directors’ behaviour, then we expect 
that, for firms that change the board to be more independent, there will be a significantly negative 
association between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and earnings 
management.  We do not expect to find any significant association for firms that do not change 
their board structure, either because the board is already dominated by independent directors, or 
because the practice is not mandatory.  The previous discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
H1b:  There is a negative association between board independence and earnings 
management for the firms that increase board independence subsequent to governance reforms. 
2.2 Executive Directors’ Share Ownership 
According to agency theory, increasing the level of executive share ownership might reduce the 
amount of owner/manager conflict leading to clearer alignment of the goals of management and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  This goal alignment argument suggests that 
ownership in the firm ensures managers will undertake risk-bearing strategies that will increase 
share value.   However, when the incentives of managers are based on their companies’ financial 
performance, it may be in their self-interest to give the appearance of better performance through 
earnings management.  The combination of management’s discretion over reported earnings and 
the effect these earnings have on their future wealth leads to a potential agency problem.  
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), suggest that the use of discretionary accruals in manipulating 
earnings is much stronger in firms where the CEO's potential total compensation is linked to the 
value of stock and option holdings. Further research (e.g. Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Park and 
Park, 2003; Richardson, Tuna and Wu, 2003) suggests that managers’ equity holdings is 
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associated with earnings management based on the assumption that managed earnings will be 
mis-priced and managers can take advantage of the mis-pricing by selling shares or exercising 
options (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). 
Agency theorists suggest that executive share ownership can have undesirable risk-
bearing properties and that managerial share ownership should be viewed with caution (Beatty 
and Zajac, 1994). According to formal agency theory, substantial managerial share ownership 
may increase the risk borne by executives. Managers are more likely to undertake high risk 
projects and manipulate earnings in order to increase their own wealth.  Therefore, increasing the 
level of executive directors’ ownership further erodes the independence of the board as high 
levels of ownership can provide incentives for executive directors to manipulate earnings to 
increase their wealth.  The preceding discussion suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between increasing executive directors’ share ownership and earnings management leading to the 
following hypothesis: 
H2a:  There is a positive association between executive directors’ share ownership and 
earnings management. 
2.2.1 The effect of regulation on the association between the executive directors’ share 
ownership and earnings management 
Since enactment of CLERP 9, executive directors (CEOs and CFOs) are required to certify to the 
board of directors that the financial statements are in accordance with the Corporations Act and 
accounting standards2. The penalty for directors for trading while insolvent and non-payment of 
debts has increased from 10 to 20 years. Executive directors’ legal responsibilities are extended 
in terms of presenting the true and fair view of the companies. Under the strengthened regulations 
and codes, earnings manipulation might have more serious consequences than previously. For 
executive directors to increase their wealth by earnings management is now more risky and thus 
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earnings manipulation is not as appealing. Under this condition, executives might reduce their 
ownership stake and try to find some other ways to increase their wealth. Contrary to agency 
theory, decreasing the level of executive share ownership might reduce the amount of 
owner/manager conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
If regulation does have a positive effect on the extent of share ownership of executive 
directors, then we expect that, for firms that reduce their executive share holdings, there will be a 
reduction in earnings management. Thus, there will be a significantly negative association 
between the executive directors’ share ownership and discretionary accruals subsequent to the 
reforms.  Alternatively, for firms where the ownership of executive directors increased post 
regulation, we expect to find a positive association with earnings management.  We do not expect 
to find any significant association for firms that do not change their executive shareholdings, 
either because the executive shareholdings are at a low level, or because the practice is not 
mandatory.  The previous discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2b:  There is a positive (negative) association between increasing (decreasing) the level 
of executive directors’ share ownership and earnings management subsequent to governance 
reforms. 
2.3 Audit Committee Effectiveness and Earnings Management 
According to agency theory, shareholders require protection because agents (management) may 
not always act in the best interests of the principals (shareholders) (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In order to overcome this problem, the board 
undertakes an oversight role that involves monitoring the CEO and other executive managers, 
approving the corporation's strategy, preparing the financial statements and monitoring the 
control system (DeZoort et al., 2002).  To improve efficiency, the board delegates some of its 
responsibilities to board committees. The audit committee is one of the special committees 
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established by the board with ninety percent of Australian listed companies having an audit 
committee (Hanrahan et al., 2004).  As the audit committee is an extension of the full board the 
audit committee is the ultimate monitor of the financial reporting process.  The primary purpose 
of audit committees is to ensure credible financial reports (see, for example, the Treadway 
Commission, 1987).  Accordingly, regulatory bodies and researchers are interested in the features 
of the audit committee that will improve its efficiency.  The characteristics associated with audit 
committee effectiveness in this study are audit committee independence and activity. 
The characteristics of the audit committee impact on the efficiency of audit committees in 
performing their responsibilities (Abbott et al. 2003). Despite their responsibilities, executive 
directors on the audit committees might still have the motivation to manipulate earnings or 
conceal earnings management to hide a deteriorating financial position.  However, independent 
directors are not likely to have incentives to manipulate earnings as their income is not reliant on 
the firm’s performance. Accordingly, it is expected that independent audit committees would 
play a positive role in reducing the probability of earnings management.   
However, prior research has found mixed results on the association between the level of 
audit committee independence and earnings management.  Some research has found a negative 
association between audit committee independence and earnings management (Bédard et al., 
2004; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2006) while other research has failed to find any significant 
association between audit committee independence and earnings management (Peasnell et al. 
2005; Xie et al. 2003). Research has found that greater audit committee independence is 
associated with better reporting quality and a reduced likelihood of fraud (McMullen and 
Raghunandan, 1996).  
Regarding, audit committee diligence; it is argued that inactive audit committees are not 
likely to supervise management effectively. Prior research and regulatory bodies suggest that 
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audit committees should hold a minimum of three or four meetings a year (Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 1991). Accordingly, it is expected that active audit committees will play a positive role 
in reducing the probability of earnings management.  Prior research has also found a negative 
association between the frequency of audit committee meetings and earnings management (Klein, 
2002; Xie et al). McMullen and Raghundan (1996) suggest that increasing the frequency of audit 
committee meetings reduces the likelihood of enforcement action by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in the U.S. The preceding discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3a: There is a negative association between audit committee independence and 
earnings management. 
H3b: There is a negative association between audit committee meeting frequency and 
earnings management. 
2.3.1 The effect of regulation on the association between the audit committee effectiveness and 
earnings management.  
With the issuance of the CLERP 9 in Australia, audit committee responsibilities and authority 
have also increased. Audit committees are now expected to ensure the integrity of the financial 
reports and to be more effective in terms of their supervisory roles than previously.  However, 
HIH Insurance Limited and One.Tel Limited both had audit committees consisting of a majority 
of non-executive directors before they collapsed. In addition, the audit committee members were 
meeting regularly. The U.S. corporate collapses of Enron, Worldcom and Global Crossing, 
demonstrated governance practices of audit committees with a minimum of three members and at 
least 60% of the members were independent (Petra, 2006). That is, these companies had the 
appearance of compliance with the regulations. 
It is difficult to conclude that improvements in the efficiency of the audit committee will 
definitely decrease earnings management.  However, these improvements might still have 
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positive effects as suggested in previous research (e.g. Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2006; Xie et 
al., 2003).  Braiotta  and   Zhou (2006) find that firms that change their audit committee structure 
are associated with decreased earnings management. 
If regulation does have a positive effect on audit committee behaviour, then we expect to 
find a significant negative association between corporate governance practices and discretionary 
accruals for firms with more effective audit committees.  That is, firms that increase the 
independence of the audit committee and/or increase the frequency of the audit committee 
meetings.  In this paper, both these practices are regarded as improving the effectiveness of the 
audit committee. The previous discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3c: There is a negative association between audit committee independence and earnings 
management for firms increasing audit committee independence following the governance 
reforms of the ASX CGC and CLERP 9. 
H3d: There is a negative association between audit committee meeting frequency and 
earnings management for firms increasing the number of audit committee meetings following the 
governance reforms of the ASX CGC and CLERP 9. 
 
3. Research Method 
The present study involves a firm fixed-effect, cross-sectional analysis of 200 firms listed on the 
ASX for the financial year ending in 2000 and 2005. Individual models are used to test the 
hypotheses.  The models regress the absolute value of performance-adjusted current discretionary 
accruals on a set of governance and control variables. 
3.1 Sample Selection Criteria 
The sample consists of 200 listed companies selected for this research for the years 2000 and 
2005 in order to make a reliable comparison of the effects of corporate governance best practice 
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recommendations. The original data set consisted of 388 top 500 firms for the year 2000.  The 
final sample of 200 firms is derived from the firms that remained listed in 2005 and also for 
which annual reports are available either on the Connect4 database, on company websites or the 
DatAnalysis database. Information regarding boards of directors and audit committee 
characteristics is obtained from disclosures made in company annual reports.   
The years 2000 and 2005 are chosen to ascertain if corporate governance reforms impact 
the corporate governance practices of firms.  After the demise of the largest global audit 
company, Arthur Andersen, in 2002, corporate governance became a much more significant issue 
than prior to 2002. 
Two significant corporate governance reforms took place between 2000 and 2005. In 
2003, the CGC released the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (PGC and BPR) although it was not mandatory to comply with these 
recommendations.  However, it was a crucial step to improve corporate governance practices. In 
2004 CLERP 9 became law in Australia and directors’ liabilities increased. This research 
investigates the impact of corporate governance reforms on the quality of financial reporting by 
comparing governance practices of firms in the years 2000 and 2005. 
The following model is developed to test the hypotheses.  Separate regressions are run for 
each independent variable to test the association with the dependent variable, PACDA. Finally, 
the complete model is tested to determine the relative significance of the governance variables on 
PACDA.  The change model tests the association between the changes in governance practices 
and PACDA. 
PACDA =  α0 + α1 PBNED + α2 PANED + α3NACM + α4 EDs SHARES + α5 SIZE+ α6 
LOSS + α7 GROWTH + α8 GEARING + α9 ROA + e    (1) 
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PACDA =  α0 + α1 DIFPBNED + α2 DIFPANED + α3DIFNACM + α4 DIFEDs SHARES + α5 
SIZE+ α6 LOSS + α7 GROWTH + α8 GEARING + α9 ROA + e    (2) 
Where: 
Dependent variable: 
PACDA = Absolute value of performance-adjusted current discretionary accruals based on 
Kothari et al. (2005) 
Independent variables: 
PBNED (-) = proportion of non-executive board directors to total directors on the 
board. 
DIFPBNED (-) = difference in the proportion of non-executive board directors 
calculated as the proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
in 2005 less the proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
in 2000. 
PANED (-) = percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee (AC).  
DIFPANED (-) = difference in the proportion of non-executive audit committee 
directors calculated as the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the AC in 2005 less the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the AC in 2000. 
NACM (-) = number of audit committee meetings per annum. 
DIFFNACM (-) = difference in the number of audit committee meetings per annum in 
2005 compared with 2000. 
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EDs SHARES (+) = the total number of ordinary shares held by the executive directors 
divided by the total number of issued ordinary shares. 
DIFEDs SHARES (+) = difference in the total number of ordinary shares held by the 
executive directors divided by the total number of issued ordinary 
shares in 2005 compared with 2000. 
Control Variables: 
SIZE (+) = natural log of total assets in million dollars. 
LOSS (?) =  dummy variable of 1 if income is <0; 0: otherwise 
GROWTH (?) =  ratio of the firm’s market value of common equity to book value of 
common equity at the beginning of the year.  
GEARING (?) = (Short term debt + long term debt - cash) / shareholders equity 
ROA (?) = Earnings before interest / (total assets less outside equity interests) 
 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, earnings management, is proxied by performance-adjusted discretionary 
accruals. Accruals can be decomposed into six categories: 
• Based on managerial control: discretionary (unexpected or abnormal) and non-
discretionary  
• Based on the time period: current and long-term  
• Based on performance: Performance adjusted and not performance adjusted 
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Persistence and permanence alone are not good indicators of earnings quality as managers 
are motivated by these characteristics to present an image of themselves as good managers. 
Dechow and Schrand (2004) suggest that large accruals (of either sign) indicate volatility and low 
quality earnings as accruals are likely to contain estimation errors and the current earnings figure 
is unlikely to reflect the company’s current operating performance, future operating performance 
or measure firm value.  Current discretionary accruals are adjustments regarding short-term assets 
and liabilities. According to recent research, current discretionary accruals are more vulnerable to 
management’s earnings manipulation (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003). Therefore, the analysis is 
based on current discretionary accruals rather than total accruals as in prior research (e.g. Oei et 
al, 2008).  Ayers et al. (2006) suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals 
and earnings intensifies around the actual profit benchmark.  
  Given the importance of the firm’s growth rate (Kothari et al., 2005) in calculating current 
discretionary accruals, the company’s performance is controlled for in the model. The dependent 
variable is termed ‘performance-adjusted current discretional accruals (PACDA)’. This measure 
is adjusted for performance by including a lagged ROA. It is predicted that improvements in 
corporate governance practices lead to an improvement in the quality of the companies’ earnings 
figure, as proxied by the level of absolute discretionary accruals.   Please see Appendix 1 for the 
PACDA calculation. 
3.3 Independent Variables 
The Board’s ability to act as an effective monitoring mechanism depends on its independence 
from management (Beasley, 1996; Davidson et al., 2005; Dechow et al., 1996). Board 
independence is measured as the proportion of non-executive directors on the board.  The 
significant role of non-executive directors in monitoring management is also documented by 
various international and local guidelines (for example, see ASX, 2003; Cadbury Committee, 
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1992; CLERP 9, 2004; NYSE, 2002).  A negative association is expected between the proportion 
of non-executive directors and PACDA (Klein, 2002).  Vafeas (2005) finds that more 
appropriately structured audit committees and boards produce higher-quality earnings 
information.  
In this study, audit committee effectiveness is proxied by two characteristics, 
independence and activity. Prior research argues that the ability of the audit committee to detect 
earnings manipulation is associated with the level of audit committee independence (Bédard et 
al., 2004; Klein, 2002; McMullen and Raghunandan 1996; Peasnell et al., 2006). Regarding audit 
committee activity, prior research argues that the effectiveness of an audit committee is also 
dependent on the frequency of meetings (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996).  In order to ensure 
the appropriateness of the financial reporting process, audit committee members should meet 
regularly (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996). Consistent with this argument, Xie et al. (2003) 
find that the frequency of audit committee meetings is negatively associated with earnings 
management. We expect that the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and audit 
committees and the frequency of audit committee meetings to be negatively associated with 
PACDA, consistent with prior research.  We do not consider the role of the independence of the 
chair of the board or the audit committee in earnings management in this study.  As the majority 
of firms in Australia have an independent board and/or audit committee chair there is little 
variation between firms sufficient for statistical analysis. 
Agency theory indicates that executive share ownership can act as an incentive to reduce 
the underlying agency problem of separation of ownership from control and increase the welfare 
of the shareholders.  However, a large body of literature suggests that extensive stock ownership 
can motivate the executives to behave opportunistically and inflate stock values artificially by 
violating reporting standards or using fraudulent reporting (Beasley 1996; Warfield et al. 1995). 
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A negative relationship is expected between earnings management (PACDA) and the 
proxies in this study for good corporate governance practices: percentage of non-executive board 
directors (PBNED); percentage of non-executive audit committee directors (PANED); and the 
number of audit committee meeting (NACM).  However, a positive relationship is expected 
between earnings management and the percentage of share ownership of executive directors, 
since this practice may compromise directors’ independence. 
The changes in the governance variables between 2000 and 2005 are regressed against 
PACDA to investigate the effects of recent corporate governance reforms. A negative 
relationship between the governance variables and PACDA is expected for firms that increase the 
proportion of non-executive directors on board (DIFPBNED) and the audit committee 
(DIFPANED) and the frequency of audit committee meetings (NACM).  A positive relationship 
is expected between the changes in executive director’s ownership (DIFEDs SHARES) and 
PACDA as increases in ownership provide greater incentives to manipulate earnings. 
3.4 Control Variables 
Firm size affects earnings manipulation (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
find that accrual quality is positively related to firm size. Since large firms have more stable and 
predictable operations and have more diversified business activities they have fewer and smaller 
estimation errors. Size is expected to be negatively associated with the management of earnings 
as large firms are more likely to report higher quality earnings, primarily due to political pressure 
and investors’ scrutiny (Warfield et al., 1995). Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets as at June 30.  
The following variables are included in the model to account for the impact on earnings 
management.  The direction of the relationship is not predicted due to the conflicting results of 
prior research. Gearing is included as a control variable as it is expected that debtors of highly 
  21 
leveraged firms are concerned when firms are approaching financial distress and are therefore 
more likely to monitor earnings closely.  On the other hand, firms with high leverage are 
motivated to manipulate earnings to meet debt covenants. According to Saleh and Ahmed (2005), 
distressed firms manipulate earnings downward and managers adopt income-decreasing accruals 
during debt renegotiation. Gearing is measured as the ratio of (short term debt + long term debt - 
cash) to shareholders equity.  
Growth opportunities of the firm are likely to have an impact on the quality of the earnings 
figure.  The ratio of market value of common equity to book value of common equity is used to 
capture the firm’s growth opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992). Firms with low growth 
opportunities have limited investment opportunities and accordingly have high free cash flows 
and excess cash. Subsequently managers working for low growth firms can act opportunistically 
by means of excessive perquisite consumption, hiding non-optimal expenditures, 
misappropriation of assets and salary enhancement (Jensen 1986). Further, firms growing rapidly 
may have internal control problems (Kinney and McDaniel 1989). Companies with high growth 
rates may have problems operating efficient audit committees and this might exacerbate the 
practice of earnings management.  Growth is measured as the ratio of market capitalisation on the 
last day of the company's financial year to shareholders equity per share (Price to Book Value).   
Return on assets is included as a control variable as it is expected that firms with lower 
performance tend to manipulate earnings figures and this should be positively associated with 
earnings management. Return on assets is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest to 
total assets less outside equity interests.  
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) find that accrual quality is negatively related with loss 
incidence. Management is more likely to manipulate the earnings figure in cases of financial 
distress. Consistent with this argument, managers are more likely to make income-increasing 
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abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions (Peasnell et al., 2005).  Firms 
with an accounting loss are included as a dummy variable, equal to “1” if the firm experienced a 
loss during the fiscal year and “0” otherwise.  Finally, industry effects are controlled for in the 
calculation of PACDA3. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 demonstrate the following for the sample of 200 firms in 
2000 and 2005. On average, executive directors in 2005 own 5 percent (6% in 2000) of the total 
issued shares with a maximum of 67 percent (62% in 2000) and a minimum of zero percent. On 
average, 75 percent (72% in 2000) of the directors on boards and 94 percent (84% in 2000) of the 
directors on audit committees are non-executive directors. There are also some companies which 
have no non-executive directors on their committees and some companies with 100 percent non-
executive directors on their committees. On average, audit committees in 2005 hold 3.6 (2.7 in 
2000) meetings in a financial year. 
Individual t-tests of the differences of the means are reported in Table 1 to determine the 
significance of the differences between the years 2000 and 2005.  There is a significant difference 
in the mean of the proportion of non-executive directors on the board (p = 0.013) and on the audit 
committee of nearly 10 percent (p = 0.000).  This result suggests that governance reforms have 
been effective in increasing board and audit committee independence.  There are significant 
differences in the mean of the number of audit committee meetings between 2000 and 2005 (p = 
0.00).  Recent reforms are effective in increasing the number of audit committee meetings by 
nearly one extra audit committee meeting per year. However, there is no significant reduction in 
executive director ownership between 2000 and 2005.  
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Insert Table 1 here. 
The Pearson’s Correlation Matrix presented in Table 2 shows that the independent 
variables, proportion of non-executive directors on the board and audit committee and number of 
audit committee meetings, are negatively associated with PACDA while executive directors’ 
ownership is positively correlated with PACDA. The negative correlation between the proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board and audit committee and PACDA supports the argument 
that as the number of independent directors on the board and audit committee increases, the 
credibility of the financial reporting improves (Beasley, 1996; Bedard et al., 2004; Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000; Persons, 2006). The number of audit committee meetings is negatively and 
significantly correlated with PACDA. This result supports the argument that a more active audit 
committee is associated with less earnings management (Xie et al., 2003; Klein, 2002; McMullen 
and Raghundan, 1996).  The results of the Pearson’s Correlation Matrix support the notion that 
executive share ownership should be viewed with caution since it might create opportunistic 
incentives for managers (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006).  Table 2, 
Panel B, reports the correlations for the differences in board and audit committee independence, 
audit committee meetings and executive directors’ shareholdings. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 Panel A reports the results of testing the association between the governance variables 
and PACDA in the year 2000, before the governance reforms, and 2005, after the governance 
reforms.  The results of testing H1(a) suggest that the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board is negatively and significantly related to PACDA in 2005.  The model explains 29.3% 
of the variability in PACDA for the year 2005, and shows that the proportion of non-executive 
  24 
directors is negatively and significantly associated with the PACDA with a negative coefficient 
of -0.634 (t = -3.341). This variable is not significant in the model for the year 2000.  Prior 
research has produced conflicting results about the relationship between PACDA and board 
independence. The results of this study demonstrate that, post-governance changes, as the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board increases, performance-adjusted discretionary 
accruals decrease.  This result supports the notion that boards of firms with high independence 
ensure financial reporting quality because they monitor managers more efficiently. This result 
supports and strengthens the results reported by prior research (i.e., Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; 
Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Persons 2006).  The control variables LOSS and ROA are 
negatively and significantly related to PACDA in the 2005 model but only ROA is significant in 
the 2000 model.  
The results of testing H2(a) suggests that PACDA is positively related to the executive 
directors share ownership in 2005 only.  The association is not significant in the year 2000.  The 
model has an adjusted R2 of 30.4% and shows that executive directors’ share ownership is 
positively and significantly associated with PACDA with a coefficient of 1.109 (t = 4.567).  Prior 
research also suggests that management share-ownership exhibits a non-linear function (Morck et 
al., 1998). Increases in the executive share ownership provides incentives for executives to act 
less opportunistically and more in the interest of the firm, while excessive share ownership 
provides managers with the voting power to pursue their own interests (Hermalin and Weisbach 
1991).  Consistent with the Morck et al, (1998) entrenchment argument, the percentage of 
director share ownership was logged to test for a non-linear relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. However, a non-linear relationship was not identified.  The results 
presented in this study support and strengthen the results reported by other researchers who argue 
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that executive share ownership should be viewed with caution since it can have undesirable risk-
bearing properties and it might create incentives for managers to behave opportunistically (e.g. 
Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006).   
The two proxies for audit committee effectiveness, audit committee independence (H3(a)) 
and the frequency of audit activity (H3(c)) are tested separately.  The results reported in Table 3 
Panel A support Hypothesis 3(a) in 2005 only.  The 2005 model has an adjusted R2 of 29.8% and 
illustrates that the proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee is negatively and 
significantly associated with the PACDA with a coefficient of -0.634 (t = -4.380).  This variable 
is not significant in the model for the 2000 year. This result supports the notion that, post the 
governance changes, the ability of the audit committee to detect earnings management is 
associated with the level of independence, supporting and strengthening prior research (Bédard et 
al., 2004; Klein, 2002; McMullen and Raghunandan 1996; Peasnell et al., 2006).  The control 
variables LOSS and ROA are negatively and significantly related to PACDA in both years.  The 
results of testing the second proxy for audit committee effectiveness, the number of audit 
committee meetings, is negatively and marginally related to PACDA (t = -1.701; p = 0.091) in 
2005 with an adjusted R2 of 24%. The association is not significant in 2000.  The results fail to 
support H3(c).  The control variables LOSS and ROA are negatively and significantly related to 
PACDA in 2005.   
The first set of regressions test whether the individual governance practices impact earnings 
management.  The full model tests whether board independence, executive directors’ 
shareholdings, audit committee independence, and audit committee meeting frequency 
simultaneously influence earnings management.  The full model examines which of the 
governance factor(s) has the most explanatory power in predicting PACDA in 2000 and 2005. 
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The results of testing the full model reported in Table 3 Panel A, shows that two of the corporate 
governance practices are significantly related to PACDA in 2005 only. The model explains 35% 
of the variability in PACDA, and demonstrates that the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the audit committee is negatively and significantly associated with the PACDA with a coefficient 
of -0.504 (t = -3.242). The model also indicates that executive directors’ share ownership is 
positively and significantly associated with the PACDA with a coefficient of 0.883 (t = 3.474). 
The control variables ROA and LOSS are negatively and significantly and SIZE is positively and 
significantly related to PACDA in 2005.   
Table 3 Panel B reports the results of examining the levels of PACDA for firms that change 
their governance practices following the governance reforms. The results of testing H1(b) 
demonstrate that the level of PACDA is significantly negative for firms that increase the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board with a negative coefficient of -0.679 (t = -
3.657).  The model has an adjusted R2 of 6.7%.   The results support the proposition that firms 
that changed their board structure following the governance reforms have less earnings 
management.  The results of testing H2(b) suggest that the change in the executive directors’ 
share ownership remains positively and significantly related to PACDA with a coefficient of 
0.968 (t = 3.995). The model with an adjusted R2 of 8% shows that when firms change the level 
of executive director ownership post the reforms they have larger discretionary accruals. The 
control variable, LOSS, is positively and significantly related to PACDA.  The results do not 
support hypothesis 3(b) and 3(d) that PACDA is negatively related to changes in the proportion 
of non-executive directors on the audit committee or increases the number of audit committee 
meetings. 
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The results of testing the full model of differences are reported in Table 3 Panel B and 
suggest that changes to two of the corporate governance practices are significantly related to 
PACDA.  The model, with an adjusted R2 of 11.1%, indicates that changes to the proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board is negatively and significantly associated with the PACDA 
with a coefficient of -0.625 (t = -3.105). The model also shows that changes to executive 
directors’ share ownership is positively and significantly associated with PACDA with a 
coefficient of 0.842 (t = 3.424). The control variable LOSS is positively and significantly related 
to PACDA.   
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
An additional test of the robustness of the results is performed using the pooled sample for 2000 
and 2005 including a dummy variable for year.  The results remained consistent with those 
reported in Table 3.  Further analysis of the effect of audit committee meeting frequency tests the 
reported results.  Whether the firm has the recommended number of meetings rather than the 
maximum number of meetings is relevant. It is not obvious that the maximum number of 
meetings reflect a well governed firm. When a firm is in crisis, the frequency of meetings is 
likely to increase. As a sensitivity test, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm holds 
up to 4 meetings, 0 otherwise, to consider this issue.  However, the results remain insignificant. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The association between firms’ corporate governance practices and earnings management is 
examined in this study. The research involves two considerations. First, whether specific 
corporate governance practices are associated with lower levels of earnings management in 2000 
  28 
or 2005.  Second, whether improvements in specific corporate governance practices between 
2000 and 2005 are associated with lower levels of earnings management.  First, consistent with 
prior research, the research findings suggest that, both the level of board independence and audit 
committee independence improves the quality of financial reporting. In addition, the results of the 
study support the stream of agency theory research that argues that increasing executive 
shareholdings imposes greater risk on the agent and therefore provides the incentive to act 
opportunistically, that is, to manage earnings. We failed to detect a significant relationship 
between the frequency of audit committee meetings and performance-adjusted discretionary 
accruals. 
 Second, the study shows that, subsequent to the reforms, board and audit committee 
independence improved and the number of audit committee meetings increased significantly. 
However, only changes to board independence, is associated with lower levels of performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals. Increasing the independence or activity of the audit committee is 
not associated with performance-adjusted discretionary accruals. However, the previously 
reported result demonstrates a significantly negative association between audit committee 
independence and PACDA, suggesting that audit committee independence is important in 
detecting earnings management. 
Complementing agency theory literature on the association between ownership and 
earnings management, this research finds evidence that increasing executive share ownership 
provides incentives to manipulate earnings regardless of governance reforms.  This result 
suggests that there should be limitations placed on the level of executive director ownership to 
mitigate the incentives to manipulate earnings. 
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 This study is subject to limitations.  As the sample covers only two years of data the 
results may not be generalisable to different time periods. The sample is based on companies that 
continue to operate from 2000 to 2005. Accordingly, delisted companies and also bankrupt 
companies are not included in the sample set. Other proxies for board and audit committee 
effectiveness, such as financial literacy and responsibilities of board and committee members, 
may show further significant associations with earnings management.  These limitations provide 
fruitful avenues for future research. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Calculation of performance-adjusted current discretionary accruals (PACDA) 
 
As suggested by Kothari et al. (2005 the cross-sectional performance-adjusted current discretionary 
accruals (PACDA) are calculated by including the lagged variable of Return on Asset (ROA).   
The parameters for calculation of expected current accruals (ECA) are estimated by using the 
following equation: 
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The expected current accruals (ECA) use the estimated parameters as follows: 
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PACDA       = (1) – (2) 
TCA  = total current accruals is net income (earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations) plus depreciation and amortisation minus operating cash flows 
for firm i in the year t; 
∆REV   = change in net revenue for firm i in the year t;  
∆AR          = change in accounts receivable for firm i in the year t; 
ROA        = Ratio of Net income before extraordinary items to total assets for firm i in the year t-
1; 
AT             = total assets for firm i in the year t; 
itε               = error term for firm i in year t; 
PACDA = )(
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 Kothari et al. (2005) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics: N = 200 
 PACDA_05 
 
PACDA_00 PBNED_05 PBNED_00 PANED_05 PANED_00 NACM_05 NACM_00 SIZE_05 
$M 
SIZE_00 
$M 
Mean 0.0223 0.0353 0.7471 0.7178 0.9358 0.8403 3.6380 2.695 2434.73 1781.51 
Median 0.0094 0.0132 0.7778 0.7500 1.0000 1.0000 3.6000 3.0000 537.55 265.22 
Std. Dev. 0.5114 0.1658 0.1695 0.1827 0.2185 0.3115 1.4665 1.7473 7602.15 437.36 
Minimum -1.3858 -0.6839 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.81 3.68 
Maximum 6.8114 1.0352 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 9.0000 11.0000 71614.51 65585.00 
t-Stat -0.3207 2.2405 4.1653 6.5030 3.8879 
p-value 
 (1-tail) 
0.3743 0.0130 0.0000 0.0000 0.00001 
  GEARING_
05 
GEARING_
00 
GROWTH_
05 
GROWTH_
00 
LOSS_05 LOSS_00 ROA_05 ROA_00 EDs 
SHARES_ 
05 
EDs 
SHARES_ 
00 
Mean 0.4376 0.4585 2.3452 2.4628 0.1750 0.2000 0.0058 0.0329 0.0509 0.0613 
Median 0.2649 0.3476 1.8550 1.4350   0.0623 0.0580 0.0012 0.0020 
Std. Dev. 1.3811 0.9459 1.9992 2.8181   0.2885 0.1539 0.0090 0.0090 
Minimum -2.3054 -1.7060 -6.7500 0.1900 0.0000 0.0000 -2.2745 -1.1972 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 12.1291 7.9583 16.4900 17.9000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3045 0.2844 0.6700 0.6240 
t-Stat -0.2088 -0.5850   -1.5609 -1.0165 
p-value  
(1-tail) 
0.4174 0.2796   0.0600 0.1553 
 
 
Notes: PACDA = absolute value of performance-adjusted current discretionary accruals based on Kothari et al. (2005). PBNED= percentage of Non executive board 
directors to total directors on the board.PANED = percentage of Non-executive directors on the audit committee (AC). NACM = Number of audit committee meetings 
per annum. EDs SHARES = the total number of ordinary shares held by the executive directors divided by the total number of issued ordinary shares. SIZE = Natural 
log of total assets in million dollars. LOSS = Dummy variable as: 1: income is <0; 0: otherwise. GROWTH = ratio of the firm’s market value of common equity to 
book value of common equity at the beginning of the year. GEARING = (Short term debt + long term debt - cash) / shareholders equity. ROA = Earnings before 
interest / (total assets less outside equity interests). 
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Table 2  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
 
Panel A 
N = 400 PACDA PBNED 
EDs 
SHARES PANED NACM LNSIZE GEARING GROWTH LOSS ROA YEAR 
PACDA 1.000           
PBNED -0.224** 1.000          
EDs SHARES 0.240** -0.326** 1.000         
PANED -0.172** 0.402** -0.149** 1.000        
NACM -0.101* 0.274** -0.098* 0.472** 1.000       
LNSIZE -0.062 0.174** -0.203** 0.228** 0.316** 1.000      
GEARING 0.110* -0.015 -0.018 -0.015 0.019 0.166** 1.000     
GROWTH 0.110* -0.045 -0.014 0.030 0.036 -0.031 0.024 1.000    
LOSS 0.046 -0.054 0.005 -0.128** -0.086* -0.441** 0.062 0.098* 1.000   
ROA -0.342** 0.105* -0.051 0.105* 0.095* 0.423** -0.094* -0.114* -0.551** 1.000  
YEAR 0.017 -0.083* 0.042 -0.175** -0.269** -0.078 0.009 0.024 0.032 0.059 1.000 
Panel B  
N = 200 PACDA DIFNACM DIFPBNED DIFPANED DIFEDs LNSIZE GEARING GROWTH LOSS ROA 
PACDA 1.000          
DIFNACM -0.041 1.000         
DIFPBNED -0.252** 0.152* 1.000        
DIFPANED -0.028 0.347** 0.343** 1.000       
DIFEDs 0.265** 0.007 -0.216** -0.148* 1.000      
LNSIZE -0.017 -0.048 -0.087 -0.062 -0.041 1.000     
GEARING -0.030 -0.086 -0.021 -0.016 -0.043 0.098 1.000    
GROWTH -0.051 0.060 0.063 0.014 0.012 0.046 0.105 1.000   
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LOSS 0.145* -0.006 0.044 0.046 -0.013 -0.490** 0.112 0.004 1.000  
ROA -0.025 -0.044 -0.090 -0.118* -0.043 0.468** -0.134* -0.097 -0.572** 1.000 
 
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). PACDA = absolute value of performance-
adjusted current discretionary accruals based on Kothari et al. (2005). PBNED= percentage of Non-executive board directors to total directors on the board. 
PANED = percentage of Non-executive directors on the audit committee (AC). NACM = number of audit committee meetings per annum. EDs SHARES = the 
total number of ordinary shares held by the executive directors divided by the total number of issued ordinary shares. SIZE = natural log of total assets in 
million dollars. LOSS = dummy variable as: 1: income is <0; 0: otherwise. GROWTH= ratio of the firm’s market value of common equity to book value of 
common equity at the beginning of the year. GEARING= (short term debt + long term debt - cash) / shareholders equity. ROA= earnings before interest / (total 
assets less outside equity interests). YEAR = dummy variable, 1 if year is 2000; 0 if year is 2005. DIFPNED= the difference in the proportion of non-executive 
board directors calculated as the proportion of non-executive directors on the board in 2005 - the proportion of non-executive directors on the board in 2000. 
DIFPANED = the difference in the proportion of non-executive audit committee directors calculated as the proportion of non-executive directors on the AC in 
2005 - the proportion of non-executive directors on the AC in 2000. DIFNACM = the difference in the number of audit committee meetings per annum in 2005 
compared with 2000. DIFEDs = the difference in the total number of ordinary shares held by the executive directors divided by the total number of issued 
ordinary. 
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                Table 3 
Regression Model: Dependent Variable: PACDA 
N = 200 
PANEL A 
 
H1a 
2000 
H1a 
2005 
H2a 
2000 
H2a 
2005 
H3a 
2000 
H3a 
2005 
H3c 
2000 
H3c 
2005 
Full Model 
2000 
Full  Model 
2005 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
 
CONSTANT ?       0.258 -.051 0.172 
 
-0.664 0.231 -0.041 
 
       0.241 -0.489 0.233 -0. 257 
  
 (1.728) (-0.131) (1.095) (-1.754) (1.549) (-0.108) (1.605) (-1.235) (1.438) (-0. 632) 
PBNED 
- -0.094 -0.634       -0.110 -0.218 
  
 (-1.441) (-3.341)**       (-1.458) (-1.102) 
EDs SHARES +   0.110 1.109     0.082 0.883 
    (1.159) (4.567)***     (0.843) (3.474)*** 
PANED 
-     0.000 -0.634   0.020 -0.504 
      (-0.009) (-4.380)***   (0.430) (-3.242)*** 
NACM 
-       
0.003 -0.041 0.005 -0.006 
        
(0.513) (-1.701) (0.674) (-0.234) 
SIZE + -.008 0.031 -0.007 0.036 -0.010 0.037 -0.011 0.037 -0.008 0.048 
  
 (-1.011) (1.630) (-0.932) (1.900)* (-1.290) (1.968)* (-1.409) (1.772) (-0.947) (2.471)** 
GEARING ? 0.002 0.028 0.003 0.024 0.003 0.031 0.004 0.030 0.003 0.024 
  
 (0.138) (1.215) (0.260) (1.055) (0.237) (1.351) (0.279) (1.254) (0.245) (1.106) 
GROWTH ? -0.004 -0.017 -0.003 -0.018 -0.003 -0.016 -0.003 -0.016 -0.004 -0.013 
  
 (-0.956) (-1.081) (-0.791) (-1.197) (-0.800) (-1.029) (-0.791) (-0.972) (-0.966) (-.875) 
LOSS ? -0.007 -0.217 -.002 -0.218 -0.003 -0.289 -0.002 -0.239 -0.005 -0.219 
  
 (-0.184) (-2.043)* (-0.042) (-2.107)* (-0.084)** (-2.801)** (-0.065) (-2.194)* (-0.132) (-2.123)* 
ROA ? 0.236 -0.975 0.245 -1.018 0.258 -1.029 0.263 -1.040 0.233 -0.959 
  
 (2.428)* (-6.902)*** (2.528)** (-7.499)*** (2.663)** (-7.562)*** (2.708)** (-7.304)*** (2.372)* (-7.159)*** 
F-value  2.298* 13.320*** 2.168* 
 
15.481*** 
 
1.931 
 
15.108*** 
 
1.977 
 
11.478*** 
 
1.713 
 
12.907*** 
Adjusted R2  0.038 0.293 0.034 0.304 0.027 0.298 0.029 0.240 0.031 0.350 
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PANEL B 
 
H1b H2b H3b H3d Full Change Model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) 
CONSTANT ? -0.248 -0.342 -0.333  -.306 
   (-0.574) (-0.766) (-0.746)  (-0. 723) 
DIFPBNED - -0.697    -0.625 
  (-3.657)***    (-3.105)*** 
DIFEDs SHARES +  0.968   0.842 
   (3.995)***   (3.424)*** 
DIFPANED -   -0.043  0.156 
    (-0.382)  (1.309) 
DIFFNACM -    -0.009 -0.009 
     (-0.507) (-0.523) 
SIZE + 0.013 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 
   (0.626) (0.955) (0.797) (0.785) (0.768) 
GEARING ? -0.021 -0.014 -0.018 -0.019 -.0017 
   (-0.785) (-0.524) (-0.674) (-0.707) (-0.652) 
GROWTH ? -0.007 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 
   (-0.417) (-0.692) (-0.619) (-0.587) -0.461) 
LOSS ? 0.277 0.309 0.285 0.284 0.300 
   (2.362)** (2.654)** (2.352)* (2.342)* (2.617)** 
ROA ? 0.065 0.130 0.091 0.094 0.116 
   (0.418) (0.838) (0.563) (0.582) (0.757) 
F-value  3.377** 3.823** 1.099 1.118 
 
3.768*** 
Adjusted R2  0.067 0.078 0.003 0.004 0.111 
 
Notes: *** Significant at the 0.001 level; **significant at the 0.01 level;* significant at the 0.05 level. Note: The variance inflation factor (VIF) 
values are less than 2, therefore there does not appear to be a problem with multicollinearity in the models. PACDA = absolute value of 
performance-adjusted current discretionary accruals based on Kothari et al. (2005). PBNED = percentage of Non-executive board directors to total 
directors on the board. DIFPNED = the difference in the proportion of non-executive board directors calculated as the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board in 2005 - the proportion of non-executive directors on the board in 2000. PANED = percentage of Non-executive directors 
on the audit committee. DIFPANED = the difference in the proportion of non-executive audit committee directors calculated as the proportion of 
non-executive directors on the AC in 2005 - the proportion of non-executive directors on the AC in 2000. NACM = number of audit committee 
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meetings per annum. DIFNACM = the difference in the number of audit committee meetings per annum in 2005 compared with 2000. EDs 
SHARES = the total number of ordinary shares held by the executive directors divided by the total number of issued ordinary shares. DIFEDs = the 
difference in the total number of ordinary shares held by the executive directors divided by the total number of issued ordinary. SIZE = natural log 
of total assets in million dollars. LOSS = dummy variable as: 1: income is <0; 0: otherwise. GROWTH = ratio of the firm’s market value of 
common equity to book value of common equity at the beginning of the year. GEARING= (short term debt + long term debt - cash)/shareholders 
equity. ROA = earnings before interest/(total assets less outside equity interests).  
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Notes 
1
 As a consequence of CLERP 9, subsection 232(2) of the Corporations Law was rewritten to capture the fiduciary 
principles of a director and imposes both criminal and civil consequences for a breach of that duty. 
2
 CLERP 9, section 295A requires the CEO and CFO to sign a declaration stating that the financial records have been 
properly maintained, they are prepared in accordance with accounting standards and they present a true and fair view 
of the company's financial standing. Subsequently, under section 295(4)(e) directors must state that they have 
received the financial statements from the CEO and CFO and they have to provide necessary information to ensure 
that financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position and performance under sections 298 (1A) 
and 306 (2) (a) (b). 
3
 The model is estimated separately for each combination of the industry code (GICS) and year to obtain industry-
specific estimates of the coefficients in the equation. 
